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Most studies to date comparing the economic performance of immigrants, among other aspects, with that of the native-born population mainly focused on the first rather than the second generation of immigrants. This motivated researchers to carry out more extensive research on the diverse aspects of absorption in various host countries among the second generation of immigrants, as compared to their parents and the native population.
Several studies on changes in the relative earnings and employment patterns of the second generation have been carried out in various countries. Chiswick (1977 Chiswick ( , 1978 , for example, in his early work, examined the effect of foreign parentage in the United States in 1969 on earnings of native-born white male workers in the 25-to-64 age range. He showed that earnings among second-generation immigrants were similar or slightly higher than among native white-born male Americans. Earnings were higher among immigrants with foreign-rather than native-born parents. Thus, according to Chiswick, any discrimination against second-generation Americans is apparently overcome by other factors.
More recently, Gang and Zimmermann (2000) and Gang (1999) showed that ethnicity did not affect the educational achievements of second-generation immigrants, compared to those of natives in the same age cohort, in a large German data set. While parental schooling did not play a role in the educational choices of children of foreign-born parents, contrary to the general findings in the literature, there is a statistically significant difference in favor of the father's over the mother's education in children of native-born German parents. Similar studies among Jewish immigrants of various ethnic origins in Israel have been carried out by Amir (1988) , Benski, HW DO (1990) , Lecker (1993) and Mark (1994) , among others. The 2 intergenerational mobility in earnings and immigrant workers assimilation in the labor market was studied by Kossoudji (1989) , Berman HW DO (1990) , Borjas (1992) and Solon (1992) , among others, in the United States; by Lillard (2000) in Germany and the United States; and by Corak HW DO (1997) in Canada. Schultz (1984) in the United States and Binder (1998) in Mexico, among others, conducted research on schooling and educational achievements of such populations.
However, since relations between immigrants and native populations in the host countries are extremely complex, it is difficult to project the well-characterized economic behavior of the first generation of immigrants and the relatively less welldeciphered behavior of the second generation into the third generation. Therefore, a multi-generation model comparing performance of immigrants and the native population in the host countries, particularly with respect to the labor market, is highly pertinent.
In this paper, we develop a multi-generation model comparing labor market performance of immigrants and the native population, assuming that the latter is the appropriate reference group and not the home-country population. The model is based on the concept of bilateral altruism among immigrant generations, i.e., positive linkage of the father's and son's utilities via their earnings. Thus, if the father earns less than the native population, the son, would maximize his own utility by investing time and effort in increasing his earnings to compensate also for his father's relatively low income. Thus, the second generation of immigrants would be expected to be in an advantaged position (at least with respect to the first generation). However, the third generation would revert to a disadvantaged status relative to the second generation, and possibly also to the native population. 3 We examined intergenerational mobility of relative earnings among immigrants to Israel, based on the 1995 Israeli Census of Population data. A two-fold comparative analysis over three generations was carried out on two levels: (1) among three generations of immigrants from Asian-African source countries; and (2) between immigrant and native Israeli populations.
In the 1995 Israeli Census of Population data, first-generation immigrants showed relatively lower earnings than the second generation, but this fell again in the third generation. This supports the hypothesis behind our multi-generation immigrant performance model. In addition, separating the wage differential into human capital and market evaluation components throws new light on the effects of the relative investment in education in these three generations.
By following immigrant economic behavior over three generations, both in theoretical and empirical terms, our model enhances understanding of economic behavior among immigrants in Israel, and may be projected to other countries.
Assimilation does not necessarily occur in the third generation, indicating that the two migrant-generation case cannot be generalized to all further generations.
A bilateral-altruistic two-generation model of immigrant earnings is presented, which is then explored on 1995 Israeli Census data, and followed by a short summary and conclusions section. Simplifying further, the effect of the father's earnings on the son's OHYHO and W\SH of education is ignored, focusing on the WLPH LQYHVWHG by the son in education, which may also be considered as invested effort (measurable in time units).
Under our assumptions, the father's utility is defined as follows:
where, , SÃ sÃ DQG , SÃ H are the father's and son's incomes, relative to those of the natives, respectively. It is assumed that 
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The son's utility, which is a function of his father's, may be expressed as follows:
where it is assumed that
and
. In addition, we assume a direct relationship between the time invested in education and the son's relative (expected)
and 0
The son aims to maximize his utility by optimizing his level of investment in education, H such that:
The first-order condition is given by:
The son's utility function is assumed to satisfy the second-order condition: .
, it follows that: As stated above,
. Therefore, we conclude:
Note that the time invested, and not the type of education, were considered (clearly, the more the father earns, the higher the son's level of education). Given the , we obtain:
This result is summarized in the following proposition:
3URSRVLWLRQ The less the father earns, the more time and effort the son invests in increasing his earnings.
Recall that we do not consider the type of education but the time the son invests in education and at the work place with the aim of increasing his income (which is equivalent to an investment in effort, which is also measured in time units). Similar analysis would also apply to the son's investment in promotion and raising his income at work.
To gain better understanding of this proposition, let us consider the following:
as a first generation migrant, the father is disadvantaged in labor market relative to the native population, due to discrimination, asymmetric information, linguistic problems, etc. The son, affected by his father's low income, invests time and effort in increasing his own earnings, and, thereby, in turn, his father's utility, to compensate for his relatively low income. Thus, the immigrant second generation would be expected to be in an advantaged position. In this case, the father's lower earnings motivate his son to invest more time and effort in education and the work place. Thus, the father's and son's earnings are inversely related, as described by the downward sloping curve AB in Fig. 1-a However, since the second-generation migrant is relatively advantaged, the thirdgeneration migrant, who no longer needs to compensate for his father's low utility by investing more effort in education and the work place, reverts to a disadvantaged status relative to the native population.
The 45 0 -line, the son's (second generation's) earnings are projected onto the horizontal axis and thus, the grandson's earnings, at point B, re3 rd , are less than re2 nd .
Of course, his income would remain higher than his grandfather's (the firstgeneration migrant), but lower than his father's (second-generation migrant). These results are summarized in Fig. 1-b , where relative earnings are on the vertical axis and migrant generations on the horizontal axis. Thus, the intergenerational mobility in earnings follows an inverse U-shaped curve: the first generation has the lowest relative earnings, the second generation has the highest, and the third generation's are higher than the first but lower than the second.
7KH 6WDWLVWLFDO $QDO\VLV 'DWD
The model is applied to the mass immigration to Israel after establishment of the state in 1948. Mass political immigration more than doubled the population of Israel between 1948 and 1952 -from 650,000 to 1.5 million. About 50% of these immigrants were from Islamic countries and the other 50% from Europe. However, since most of the absorbing (native) population in Israel at that time was from Europe, we focused on immigrants from the Islamic countries in Asia and Africa to avoid the effects of migration externalities. Table 1 presents the characteristics of groups N and A in the three generations in terms of education, years of schooling and six categories of the highest certificate, age and wages. Note that there may well be self-selection in ERWK groups at this stage.
The average ages of both groups are very similar in all the generations (see Table 1 ).
The data are expressed as relative levels or percentages of the native (N) and immigrant (A) groups. However, to keep the interpretation consistent, education at the lower levels (without elementary or high school certificates) is calculated as the ratio between A and N, and at higher levels, as ratio between N and A. Thus, ratios greater than 1 favor group N and less than 1 favor A. Moreover, in ILUVW and the WKLUG generation migrants, the average wage and years of schooling are higher among the Israeli native (N) group than among the immigrants (A) whereas, in the VHFRQG generation, the opposite was found. In Fig. 2 , the education ratio is greater than 1 for the first generation at all the levels of education, i.e., immigrants are less well educated than natives. The education ratios for the second generation is less than 1 (except for B.A., M.A. and Ph.D degrees in which the difference between N and A was greatly reduced relative to the first generation) i.e., in the immigrant second generation, the gap between their own and the native education levels closed. As in the first generation, the education levels were lower in the immigrant third generation than among the natives (except at the Ph.D. level).
These descriptive data coincide with the theoretical findings. On average, the second generation invests more time and effort in education than the first and third migrant generations. This trend is broken in immigrant third generation relative to the first. These findings indicate an increased investment in education by the migrant second generation, relative to the first, with a decrease in the third generation (note that the third generation's performance is inferior to the second's, but superior to that of the first).
7KH (PSLULFDO $QDO\VLV
The empirical analysis explores the hypothesis behind the model: that the immigrant second generation's labor market performance is better than either their parent's or son's, and even exceeds that of the absorbing native population. Toward The wage decomposition is carried out according to established methods (see, for example, Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Cotton, 1988; and Oaxaca HW DO, 1994) . Let The estimated average observed lnW j for group j is given by:
where M β is a vector of the estimated least-squares regression coefficients and M ; is a vector for the average observed characteristics of the individuals in group j. Based on Equation (12), the wage differential between two groups, a and b, is given by:
The right hand side of Equation (13) can be decomposed to either: (14) and (15) are the two components of the wage differentials between the groups. The first and second terms describe the differences between the average characteristics of the groups, and market valuations, as manifested in the coefficients in the estimated equations, respectively. This probably reflects differences in the quality of the human capital between the two groups.
In this study, as with wage differentials, the human capital component takes into account the last school attended or the highest degree, years of education and experience in the labor market, which is measured as age minus years of schooling minus 6 years. Table 3 presents the wage differentials and their decomposition in the three generations, based on the wage equations in Table 2 . The figures in these tables clearly show that for the first and third generations, the wage differentials are higher for the Israeli native population whereas, in the second generation the opposite holds.
According to the decomposition of wage differentials, the human-capital component of the wage differentials markedly decreases with the immigrant generations. In the first generation, about 70% of the gap in favor of the native population can be explained by the differences in the observed characteristics and the other 30% by market evaluations. In the second and the third generations, the entire wage differential is attributable to market evaluation, and is in favor of the immigrants in the second generation but of the native population in the third generation. The results of this decomposition is in line with the model, in which disadvantage of the immigrant first generation motivates the second generation to increase their labor 13 market achievements via higher educational qualifications, as seen in Table 1. However, the second generation's success in labor market leads to reversion to the disadvantaged status in the third generation relative to the native population.
As with the descriptive data, the wage differential analysis is also consistent with the theoretical results. Since descriptive data relating to years of schooling is embedded in the wage decomposition, the relationship between immigrant generations and their earnings and wages relative to one another and to the native population is an inversely U-shaped curve.
6XPPDU\ DQG &RQFOXVLRQV
Starting with Chiswick (1977 Chiswick ( , 1978 to Gang and Zimmermann (2000) and Gang (1999) , more recently, the literature focuses on first-and second-generation migrants, in terms of their earnings and economic performance in relation to one another and to the native population. However, the migrant third generation has been neglected in the literature. Thus, it remained unclear whether: (1) the two-generation relationship can be generalized to further generations; and (2) the migrant third generation assimilates into the general population.
In an attempt to address these questions, we developed a three-generation migrant model. We proposed a bilateral-altruistic two-generation model of immigrant earnings, in which the father's and son's utilities are positively linked through their earnings. According to the theoretical model, performance of the second generation is improved first, while that of third generation falls below the second generation's but is better than that of the first.
To explore this hypothesis, we analyzed the 1995 Israeli Census of Population, covering three generations of migrants to Israel. We showed that the empirical analysis coincides with the theoretical findings. An inverse U-shaped relationship of 14 the migrant generation data to the migrant education level was found. A similar inverse U-shaped curve describes the behavior of the intergenerational earnings mobility. The first generation has the lowest relative earnings, the second generation the highest relative earnings, and the third generation has earnings that are relatively higher than those of the first, but lower than those of the second-generation migrants.
In conclusion, therefore, generalizations may not be drawn from the two-generation migrant model applying to the migrant third generation. These data illustrate a case in which the third generation does not assimilate into the local population. The values in brackets (%) are the differences in the average estimated wages of the two groups or their relative shares of the decompositions of the wage differentials, respectively (thus, the sum of the latter is 100%).
